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THE FEDERAL POWER ACT'S CONTROVERSIAL
MUNICIPAL PREFERENCE: THE MER WIN DAM
DISPUTE AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO
AMEND FEDERAL HYDRO-LICENSING
PROCEDURES
For more than a half-century, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC or Commission) and its predecessor, the Federal Power Commission
(FPC), regulated hydroelectric development of the nation's rivers under the
Federal Power Act (FPA) with little interference by Congress.' However, in-
creasing criticism of the FERC has reawakened congressional interest in hydro-
power regulation.2  Congress recently considered a number of proposals to
amend the FPA.8 Of these, seven related directly to a controversy born in the
1970s between public and private power:4 the issue of preference in competitive
FERC relicensing proceedings.
Section 7(a) of the Federal Power Act directs the FERC to give initial
licensing preference to municipal and state project applicants;' however, the
statute does not clearly specify whether the FERC must also apply the prefer-
ence in its relicensing proceedings.6 Several Commission orders and court deci-
sions since 1978 have only added to the controversy, which intensifies as more
licenses expire each year.7 Presently, the D.C. Circuit United States Court of
1. Originally enacted in 1920, the Federal Power Act has not been substantially amended since 1935.
16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828(c) (1982). The FERC took over the FPC's duties in 1977. Department of Energy
Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 301(b), 401-407, 92 Stat. 565, 578, 582-587 (1977).
2. The FERC's critics cite the Commission's refusal to cooperate with state and other federal agencies.
See, e.g., Statement of Keith L. Colbo, Chairman, Northwest Power Planning Council to the Subcommittee
on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Commerce Committee (Sept. 11, 1984); Wolfe, Hydro-
power: FERC Licensing and Emerging State-Federal Water Rights Conflicts, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 851 (1983).
3. In 1985, Congress considered at least nine separate pieces of legislation to amend various provisions
of the FPA. See infra note 75 (listing seven of the bills); see also S. 870, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980),
introduced by Senator Mitchell of Maine (to amend section 10(a) of the Act); Congressman Swift of Wash-
ington circulated a draft bill to amend section 10(a).
4. "Public" power companies include state and municipal units for developing electricity, as distin-
guished from the investor-owned "private" power companies. However, most statutes consider all regulated
electricity producers and retailers to be "public utilities" whether they are publicly or privately owned. See,
e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 757.005 (1983).
5. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982); see infra note 15 and accompanying text. Section 7(a) provides:
In issuing preliminary permits hereunder or licenses where no preliminary permit has been issued
and in issuing licenses to new licensees under section 808 of this title the Commission shall give
preference to applications therefor by States and municipalities, provided the plans for the same
are deemed by the Commission equally well adapted, or shall within a reasonable time to be fixed
by the Commission be made equally well adapted, to conserve and utilize in the public interest the
water resources of the region. ...
6. Under the current regulatory scheme, the FERC may license hydroprojects for up to 50 years. Upon
expiration, project operators must return to the Commission for relicensing. See infra note 13.
7. Almost 300 hydropower licenses, involving more than 500 dams, are due to expire before the year
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Appeals is grappling with the issue in Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v.
FERC (Merwin Dam)-'
This article surveys circumstances leading to the public preference contro-
versy, analyzes the D.C. Circuit's attempts to resolve the controversy in the
Merwin Dam case, and examines legislative proposals to modify or eliminate
the municipal preference. In the final analysis, the Merwin Dam case may
prove most significant as a spur to congressional action against the municipal
preference and in favor of a preference for existing licensees. Such a change
would return stability to the hydropower market, potentially yielding net sav-
ings of up to 4.5 billion dollars per year for ratepayers.'
I. THE ORIGINS OF CONTROVERSY
A. The Federal Power Act's Municipal Preference
At the turn of the twentieth century, private power companies monopo-
lized the nation's electric power industry, charging high rates for poor service
made available only in urban areas.1 In response, Progressive conservationists,
led by Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot, promoted federal regulation of
waterpower development to secure cheap and widely distributed electricity
through "efficient" resource management." The 1920 Federal Water Power
Act culminated their efforts.1 2
By providing limited license terms," a recapture provision,1' and a munic-
ipal preference clause, 5 the 1920 Act sought to guarantee the competitiveness
of public power in hydroelectric power generation. Specifically, the preference
provision of section 7(a) requires the Commission to "give preference to appli-
cations . . .by States and municipalities, provided the plans for the same are
deemed by the Commission equally well adapted . . . to conserve and utilize in
2000. ELECTRIC CONSUMERS PROTECTION ACT OF 1985, S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985).
8. Initially, the court ruled that the FERC must apply the municipal preference on relicensing, but
quickly vacated its decision and granted a rehearing en banc. 775 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated, No.
83-2231, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 1986).
9. See United States General Accounting Office, Evaluation of Cost Estimates Related to the Relicens-
ing of Hydroelectric Projects, transmitted in a letter from G.A.O. Director J. Dexter Peach to the Honorable
Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, House of Representatives [hereinafter GAO Report], at 2, reprinted in, ELECTRIC CONSUM-
ERS PROTECTION ACT OF 1985, S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 245, 248 (1985).
10. See, e.g., President Roosevelt's statement at 43 CONG. REC. 978, 979-80 (1909). For detailed anal-
yses of the Progressive Conservation movement, see S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFI-
CIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959); Fl,, The Role of the Federal
Government in the Conservation and Utilization of Water Resources, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 274 (1938);
Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legislation, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 9
(1945).
11. See S. HAYS, supra note 10, at 91.
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828(c) (1982). On the struggle which culminated in the 1920 Act, see J. KER-
WIN, FEDERAL WATER-POWER LEGISLATION (1926).
13. Section 6 of the Act limits license terms to fifty years. 16 U.S.C. 4 799 (1982). Pending legislation
would reduce license terms to 30 years. See infra notes 78 and 82.
14. Section 7(c), 16 U.S.C. § 800(c) (1982).
15. Section 7(a), 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982). See supra note 5.
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the public interest the water resources of the region." 1 Thus, where competing
applications would equally serve the public interest, section 7(a) provides the
preference as a tie-breaker, directing the FERC to license the public operator.
For fifty years after 1920, the FPA's municipal preference clause incited
little controversy. The FPC and the FERC consistently applied the preference
in their initial licensing decisions. 17 However, controversy arose in the 1970s
that today threatens the elimination of the preference clause.
B. The Relicensing Issue
By 1971, hydroelectric project licenses originally issued in the 1920s began
to expire in accordance with the FPA's restriction on license terms.' 8 Project
operators returned to the FPC, and later to the FERC, for "new" licenses.' 9
When states and municipalities filed competing applications to take over those
projects, under section 15(a) of the Federal Power Act,20 the Commission had
to decide whether section 7(a)'s public preference applied on relicensing.
The issue is controversial because it dichotomizes equally-suited competi-
tors fighting over "extremely valuable rights" meted out by the FERC.' Pri-
vate power interests contend that the preference clause gives municipalities and
states an unfair advantage in relicensing proceedings, destabilizing the electric-
ity market by causing sudden rate increases to consumers, contrary to the intent
of Congress when it enacted the Federal Power Act."' Public power advocates
counter that the preference is necessary to prevent privately-owned utilities
from monopolizing the nation's waterpower resource.28
The FERC has been grappling with the municipal preference problem
since its inception in 1977,"1 the courts have been involved since 1980, and
Congress has been looking into the matter for two years and appears to be on
the verge of eliminating the public preference from FERC relicensing decisions.
16. Id. On the anti-private monopoly purpose of this provision, see Poirier & Hardin, Public Prefer-
ence and the Relicensing of Hydroelectric Projects, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 459, 466-69 (1984)
17. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 2 F.P.C. 300, 305 (1940) ("When an application for prelimi-
nary permit or license filed by a private power company conflicts with an application filed by a State or
municipality, preference is given to the latter by the language of Section 7(a) of the Federal Power
Act. ); FERC Regulations, 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.33(g)(3) & 4.37(b)(3) (applying the municipal preference to
initial permitting and licensing proceedings).
18. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19. Under the Federal Power Act, relicensing applications are treated as applications for new licenses.
16 U.S.C. § 808 (1982). See infra note 20.
20. 16 U.S.C. § 808 (1982). Section 15(a) provides:
the commission is authorized to issue a new license to the original licensee upon such terms and
conditions as may be authorized or required under the then existing laws and regulations, or to
issue a new license under said terms and conditions to a new licensee.
21. ELECTRIC CONSUMERS PROTECrIoN ACT OF 1985, S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 5
(1985).
22. See, e.g., Poirier & Hardin, supra note 16, at 478-79. On Congress' intent to provide low-cost
power through the FPA, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Radin, Federal Energy License Belongs to No Company, THE OREGONIAN at B1
(1985); see also, S. REP. No. 161, supra note 21, at 228 (Minority Views of Senator Metzenbaum).
24. The FERC was created under the Department of Energy Act of 1977 to take over the FPC's
duties under the Federal Power Act. See supra note 1.
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II. THE MUNICIPAL PREFERENCE CONTROVERSY IN THE COURTS
A. City of Bountiful
At first blush, section 7(a) appears to make its public preference inapplica-
ble in relicensing proceedings against existing licensees because of section
15(a)'s distinction between "new" and "original" licensees. Specifically, section
7(a)'s preference expressly applies only in cases involving "new licensees under
section 15," which authorizes the Commission to issue "new" licenses to "origi-
nal" licensees or to "new" licensees, in the event the United States does not
exercise its option to recapture a project after its initial license expires. 5 In
1975, a FERC administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that the "plain meaning"
of sections 7(a) and 15(a), read together, denies preference to public applicants
in competitive relicensing proceedings against "original" licensees. 26 However,
this decision was vacated on review by the full Commission in Carolina Power
& Light (Carolina Power) on abstention grounds.21
Four years later, the FERC decided City of Bountiful (Bountiful), apply-
ing the municipal preference to all Commission relicensing proceedings.28 The
City of Bountiful, Utah, and Utah Power & Light (UP&L) filed competing
applications for a new license to operate UP&L's Weber River Project. In July
1978, Bountiful petitioned the FERC for an order declaring the city entitled to
relicensing preference under sections 7(a) and 15(a) of the FPA. 9 Many
groups intervened on both sides of the controversy. Among the intervenors sup-
porting Bountiful was the Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency (Clark-Cow-
litz or JOA), a municipality established in 1976 to compete for Pacific Power
& Light's (PP&L) Merwin Dam Project. PP&L intervened on behalf of
UP&L.8 0
In a lengthy opinion, the FERC declared that section 7(a)'s preference
applies in all competitive relicensing proceedings. 1 Unlike the ALJ in Caro-
lina Power, the FERC found "sufficient ambiguity" in sections 7(a) and 15(a)
to require resort to legislative history to discern the purpose of the provisions. 82
A review of that history convinced the Commission that Congress intended sec-
tion 7(a)'s public preference to apply on relicensing.38 The FERC also based
25. See supra note 5 and 20.
26. The ALJ's ruling is reprinted in the Commission's Carolina Power & Light decision, 55 F.P.C.
1272, 1276 (1976).
27. Carolina Power & Light, 55 F.P.C. 1272 (1976). Specifically, the Commission ruled that the ALJ
should have abstained from addressing the preference issue after determining that neither party to the pro-
ceeding was a municipality under the FPA. Id. at 1274. The FPC concluded that the preference issue should
await resolution in a case where it would affect the parties to the proceeding. Id. The FERC arrived at this
same conclusion three years later in Escondido Mutual Water Co., 6 F.E.R.C. 61,189 at 61,404 (1979),
after concluding that neither party to the proceeding was a municipality under the FPA.
28. City of Bountiful, 11 F.E.R.C. 61,337 (1980).
29. Id. at 61,710.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 61,711.
32. Id. at 61,727; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
33. Bountiful, 11 F.E.R.C. at 61,716. Specifically, the Commission relied on an October 31, 1917
memorandum from O.C. Merrill, then Chief Engineer of the Forest Service, which stated the principles of
the Wilson Administration's water power bill, including the importance of giving states and municipalities an
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its determination on the lack of a reasonable alternative interpretation. Accord-
ing to the Commission, the interpretation promoted by UP&L and other pri-
vately-owned utilities-that section 15(a) makes section 7(a)'s preference inap-
plicable in competitive relicensing proceedings against original
licensees-would produce "absurd results as well as a regulatory gap" because
it would apply the preference in some relicensing cases but not in others. 4
Thirty-eight private utility companies, including PP&L, appealed the
FERC's ruling to the Eleventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals."8 Four
public utilities, including Clark-Cowlitz intervened on behalf of the Commis-
sion."6 After determining that the case was ripe for review, the appeals court
affirmed the FERC's ruling in Alabama Power Co. v. FERC. 7 The court
agreed with the FERC that the relevant statutory language was ambiguous and
found the legislative history "helpful," though "weak for the purpose of deter-
mining legislative intent."38 However, the appeals court, like the FERC, was
convinced that the interpretation promoted by the petitioners would achieve
"absurd results" in cases where the public applicant is the original license
holder-by applying for the "new" license, the state or municipality would, in
fact, lose its preference-and cause "confusing and sporadic" administration of
the preference clause.3 9 Mostly, however, the court deferred to the Commis-
sion's interpretation, in accordance with well-settled principles of administra-
tive law limiting the reviewability of agency interpretations of enabling
legislation.
4 0
B. The Merwin Dam Case
1. FERC Reverses Its Bountiful Interpretation: A Secret Meeting and
the Merwin Dam Order
The FERC's victory in Alabama Power established the applicability of the
FPA's public preference to all Commission relicensing decisions. But the
FERC soon came to consider that ruling a defeat. After the 1980 presidential
election, the Commission underwent a substantial change in personnel, produc-
ing significant policy changes.41 On April 25, 1983, the new Commission,
meeting in secret, abruptly reversed its position on the preference issue and
voted to support efforts to obtain Supreme Court review of the Alabama Power
opportunity to acquire privately-owned projects after initial licenses expired. Id. at 61,715. The Commission
discovered no subsequent history conflicting with Merrill's views. Id. at 61,716.
34. Id. at 61,731.
35. Alabama Power Company v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 1982).
36. Id. at 1314 n.6.
37. Id. at 1318.
38. Id. at 1317-18.
39. Id. at 1316.
40. Id. at 1316, 1318. But see D.C. Circuit Judge Mikva's determination, infra text accompanying
note 61, that the lth Circuit did not merely defer to the Commission's interpretation, but independently
assessed section 7(a). On the doctrine of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations of enabling
legislation, see, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982) ("the interpretation of an agency charged with
the administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference.")
41. See Clark-Cowlitz Joint'Operating Agency v. FERC, 775 F.2d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1985), petition
for reh'g granted, 787 F.2d 674 (D.C.Cir. 1986).
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decision."" When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the FERC itself re-
jected the Eleventh Circuit's review of the law in Pacific Power & Light Co.
(Merwin Dam)."
The FPC initially licensed PP&L's Merwin Dam Hydroelectric Project in
1929." In 1976, three years before its 50-year license expired, the utility ap-
plied to the Commission for relicensing. Soon after, Clark-Cowlitz, a coopera-
tive established to compete for PP&L's license and a "municipality" under sec-
tion 3 of the FPA, filed its competing application."
On October 6, 1983, the FERC officially overruled Bountiful and
awarded a new license to the private applicant, PP&L.'I The "new" Commis-
sion rejected the JOA's claim that the statutory language concerning the prefer-
ence issue was ambiguous, basing its decision on the "clear, plain and reasona-
ble" meaning of section 7(a),' 7 which according to the FERC, denies preference
to municipalities in competitive relicensing proceedings against "original" licen-
sees, under section 15(a)." Thus, the 1983 Commission sided with the ALJ in
the 1976 Carolina Power decision, against the 1980 Commission in Bountiful,
and against the Eleventh Circuit's Alabama Power ruling. The FERC was not
troubled by Alabama Power because, it concluded, the Eleventh Circuit in that
case merely deferred to the agency's interpretation of its own statute,'49 and
therefore presented "no legal impediment" to the Commission's subsequent cor-
rection of that interpretation.6"
Ultimately, the FERC's rejection of Bountiful in Merwin Dam was un-
necessary because the Commission determined that the private utility's applica-
tion was better adapted to the public interest based on "broad economic consid-
erations.'"1 These considerations included that comparative costs of alternative
power to the utilities and potential rate impacts on their customers resulting
from the Commission's relicensing decision. The FERC concluded that the cost
of alternative power to PP&L, if denied the license, would be greater than the
cost of alternative power to the JOA, if the Commission rejected its applica-
tion.52 Assuming those costs would result in higher rates to consumers, the
Commission ruled that PP&L's application was better adapted to the public
interest under sections 7(a) and 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, entitling the
privately-owned utility to the new license.58
42. Id. at 369-70.
43. 25 F.E.R.C. 61,052 (1983).
44. Id. at 61,175.
45. Id. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
46. Merwin Dam, 25 F.E.R.C. at 61,176.
47. Id. at 61,179.
48. Id. at 61,176.
49. Id. at 61,175, 61,178.
50. Id. at 61,177.
51. Id. at 61,195-201; see Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 370-71.
52. The FERC staff estimated a potential net cost of almost 20 million dollars if the Commission
granted the new license to Clark-Cowlitz. Pacific Power & Light, 25 F.E.R.C. at 61,198.
53. Merwsn Dam, 25 F.E.R.C. at 61,195-96.
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2. The D.C. Circuit Reverses the FERC
Clark-Cowlitz appealed, the FERC's ruling to the D.C. Circuit, arguing
that (1) the FERC's reversal of Bountiful was unlawful with respect to the
parties on preclusion grounds, (2) the Bountiful interpretation of section 7(a)
was the one correct interpretation, and (3) the FERC's economic analysis,
under the "best adapted" standard, was unreasonable and arbitrary.5 ' The ap-
peals court agreed, reversing the FERC's Merwin Dam order and remanding
the case to the Commission for a new proceeding applying the municipal
preference.5"Judge Mikva, writing for a unanimous panel, concluded that the Bounti-
ful decision precluded the FERC from relitigating the municipal preference
issue as to Clark-Cowlitz and PP&L, both of whom were partiesto the earlier
proceeding. 6 In addition, by invalidating the FERC's new interpretation of
section 7(a) as "unsupported by either the statute's language or its legislative
history," the court prevented the FERC from applying it in future cases."7 The
court found that section 1 5(a)'s distinction between "new" and "original" licen-
sees, relied on by the FERC in its interpretation of section 7(a), merely "high-
lights an ambiguity in the statute."" 8 After reviewing the provisions' legislative
history, the court concluded that Congress intended the Commission to apply
the preference in all relicensing proceedings. 9 The court also relied on the
Eleventh Circuit's Alabama Power ruling, which, according to Judge Mikva,
did not merely defer to the FERC's Bountiful interpretation, but independently
assessed section 7(a) of the FPA, and held that the FERC's original interpreta-
tion was the one correct interpretation of that statute.6" Judge Mikva severely
rebuked the FERC for its lack of respect for court decisions and prior Commis-
sion positions, stating:
"We find disturbing . . . the Commission's suggestion that it is free to reinterpret stat-
utes in any way it pleases without regard for precedent, and equally disturbing the hint
that the Commission does not think itself in anyway bound by the actions of prior
Commissions, let alone court decisions affirming those actions."'
54. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 368. At the same time, the JOA filed suit against the FERC for
withholding transcripts of its April 25, 1983 secret meeting. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see
also infra note 55.
55. Clark Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 368. In a separate opinion, the D.C. Circuit ordered FERC to make
public transcripts of its April 25, 1983 closed meeting. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, .775
F.2d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1985), petition for reh'g granted, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Immediately
following this ruling, the author requested those transcripts both informally and under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982), but the FERC refused to comply, pending possible appeal. See FERC
Response to Author's Request Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Nov. 15, 1985). Of
course, since then, the D.C. Circuit has granted a rehearing in the Merwin Dam case. See infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
56. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 375 ("every consideration of equity, judicial economy, and consistency
militates in favor of a finding of preclusion here.").
57. Id. at 376.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 379 ("the legislative history removes any shadow of doubt as to what Congress wanted to
happen when relicensing time arrived. The municipal preference applies to all relicensing including those
involving an incumbent licensee.")
60. Id. at 3372-73.
61. Id. at 375.76.
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The court subsequently rejected the economic impacts analysis employed
by the FERC in its Merwin Dam order as part of its "best adapted" standard
for reviewing competing applications.62 Judge Mikva concluded that the
FERC's comparative consumer cost analysis would effectively nullify the mu-
nicipal preference provision of section 7(a), citing legislative history indicating
that Congress intended to prevent the Commission from exercising discretion
over implementation of the preference clause."
In a concurring opinion, Judge Wright agreed with Judge Mikva that the
FERC's Merwin Dam interpretation of section 7(a) was unreasonable, and
therefore invalid, in light of what he perceived as Congress' clear intention that
the Commission apply the public preference on relicensing.64 However, he dis-
agreed with Judge Mikva's assessment of the Alabama Power decision: accord-
ing to Judge Wright, the Eleventh Circuit merely deferred to the agency in
reviewing the FERC's Bountiful interpretation of section 7(a). 5 Moreover,
Judge Wright was reluctant to agree with the court's decision foreclosing the
FERC from changing its interpretation of the preference clause in a case in-
volving parties to the Bountiful proceeding because of his concern that such a
decision might unduly bind future Commissions to outdated policies.66 Never-
theless, Judge Wright found the FERC's Merwin Dam order arbitrary and
capricious because it did not address the ALJ's conclusions under the "best
adapted" standard of application review; while he would not preclude the
FERC's "broad economic considerations," he felt that the Commission should
at least consider the ALJ's findings before drawing its own conclusions. 67
3. The D.C. Circuit Vacates Its Merwin Dam Ruling
The D.C. Circuit decided Merwin Dam on October 22, 1985. PP&L im-
mediately petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc, arguing that the court
had improperly overruled the "broad economic considerations" employed by the
FERC as part of its "best adapted" analysis." The utility relied on language
from the Commission's Bountiful ruling which supported the FERC's consid-
eration of economic factors in its comparative analysis of applications.69 PP&L
further alleged that a review of technical factors in the competing proposals
would indicate that its application is better adapted to the public interest, and
therefore, the court's application of the tie-breaking preference was inappropri-
62. Id. at 382.
63. Id. at 380-81. In addition, the court ruled that FERC's application of the economic analysis to the
parties in Merwin Dam was arbitrary and capricious because it conflicted with the ALJ's findings that the
parties were equally well-adapted, but ignored the ALJ's analysis. Id. at 382. See infra note 67 and accom-
panying text.
64. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 383 (Wright, J. concurring)
65. Id. at 382.
66. Id. at 382-83.
67. Id. at 383.
68. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Appropriateness of Rehearing En Banc, Clark-Cowlitz
Joint Operating Agency v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, No. 83-2231 at 7 (Dec. 4, 1985). See
also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
69. Id. at 4.
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ate.70 Finally, the petitioner argued that the FPA's judicial review provision
precludes the court from reviewing the FERC's conclusion that PP&L's appli-
cation to operate Merwin Dam is "better adapted to the public interest."' On
January 16, 1986, the D.C. Circuit, by majority vote, vacated its Merwin Dam
ruling and ordered a rehearing en banc.
Arguments for and against allowing the FERC to consider broad economic
factors in reviewing competing applications under its "best adapted" standard
reflect a conflict between a statutory provision and a policy inherent to the
Federal Power Act. Obviously, if the FERC ignores the economic implications
of its decisions, it impedes Congress' implicit goal of securing economical elec-
tric power.7 3 On the other hand, if the Merwin Dam court rules that the FERC
properly employed the comparative cost analysis as part of its "best adapted"
standard of application review, the FPA's preference provision would effec-
tively be nullified; the economic analysis would virtually guarantee that com-
peting applications would never be "equal" and, as a result, the tie-breaking
preference would become an anachronism. Such a result is contrary to settled
judicial principles requiring courts to effectuate legislative enactments. 7 Thus,
Merwin Dam presents the D.C. Circuit with a dilemma, requiring the court to
choose between two interpretations of a statute, neither of which is entirely
satisfying.
Congress may be a better forum for deciding the public preference contro-
versy. It may amend the Federal Power Act to clarify its policy priorities,
resolving the court's dilemma. However, even if Congress amends the FPA's
preference clause, the Merwin Dam case would likely be exempted from the
legislation because of the settled expectations of the parties to the dispute.
III. MUNICIPAL PREFERENCE IN CONGRESS
A. Pending Legislative Proposals to Amend Section 7(a) of the FPA
While the D.C. Circuit continues to grapple with Merwin Dam, public
and private power interests have taken their concerns to Congress. In 1985,
renewed congressional interest in hydropower regulation produced seven legis-
lative proposals to modify, eliminate or reinforce section 7(a)'s preference
clause .7  Two of those seven bills, S. 426 and H.R. 44, were passed early in
1986 by the Senate and House, respectively, and are now before a joint confer-
70. Id. at 9-10.
71. Id. at 10-14.
72. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC, 787 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
73. On this goal, see supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
74. Judge Mikva recognized that the preference would be nullified if the FERC were allowed to
employ broad economic considerations, which could effectively guarantee that no ties would ever arise. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text. The seven bills included S. 426, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985), introduced by Senator Wallop (discussed infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text); H.R. 44,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), introduced by Mr. Shelby (discussed infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text);
S. 403, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), introduced by Senator Johnston; S. 1219, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985),
introduced by Senator Metzenbaum; S. 1260, introduced by Senator Evans; H.R. 1815, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985), introduced by Mr. Matsui; and H.R. 1959, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), introduced by Mr. Miller.
See also S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1985).
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ence committee for consolidation.
1. S. 426
On April 17, 1986, the Senate, by majority vote, passed S. 426, a measure
introduced by Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop to eliminate the municipal
preference from FERC relicensing proceedings and require the Commission to
renew existing licenses meeting its public interest standard .7  As approved, the
bill would require the FERC to consider the relative economic impacts of its
relicensing decisions on applicants and their ratepayers, 77 and require increased
compensation of original licensees not awarded new licenses.1
2. H.R. 44
The House of Representatives passed H.R. 44 only four days after the
Senate passed S. 426.19 The bills are similar in most respects. Both measures
eliminate the municipal preference from FERC relicensing proceedings and re-
quire the Commission to consider the rate impacts of its relicensing decisions.8"
But, unlike the Senate bill, which creates a new preference in favor of original
licensees, H.R. 44 provides no tie-breaking procedure at all." Perhaps this is
in recognition that no ties would arise under a statute requiring the FERC to
undertake a complete economic impacts analysis when reviewing competing ap-
plications on relicensing."' Finally, both S. 426 and H.R. 44 would exempt the
76. S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. S. 4445-51 (April 17, 1986).
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id. at 9. In addition, the bill would substantially amend other provisions of the Federal Power Act.
For example, section 3 of the bill would require the FERC to consider, as part of its licensing examination
under section 10(a) of the FPA, "the extent to which a project is consistent with a comprehensive plan or
plans" prepared by appropriate authorized state and federal agencies, including the Northwest Power Plan-
ning Council. Note, however, that this provision would add nothing to the FERC's mandate under existing
law. See id. at 8 ("section 3 does not impose any new duties or obligations beyond those which the FERC is
already subject to under existing law nor would it modify current FERC practice"). On the FPA's compre-
hensive planning requirement and the FERC's refusal to plan for development, see Cole, Reviving the Fed-
eral Power Act's Comprehensive Plan Requirement: A History of Neglect and Prospects for the Future, 16
ENVTL. L. 639 (1986).
S. 426 would also limit license terms under the Federal Power Act to thirty years and section 10 of the
bill would establish fish and wildlife agency conditions to FERC-regulated projects as prerequisites for re-
ceiving PURPA benefits, such as exemption status and tax credits. See S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-3 (1985).
79. H.R. 44, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H1996-2012 (1986).
80. ELECTRIC CONSUMERS PROTECTION ACT OF 1985, H.R. REP. No. 507, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5
(1986); see also supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. Specifically, the House bill would prevent the
Commission from licensing any other applicant if to do so would result in rate increases for the consumers of
the original licensee.
81. However, the House bill creates a de facto preference for original licensees by prohibiting the
FERC from awarding a license to a new applicant where so doing would cause rate increases to the original
licensee's customers. See id. at 4. It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation in which a rate
increase would not befall an original licensee's customers upon issuance of a new license to a new applicant.
82. An economic analysis of competing applications will always yield differentiation if sufficiently de-
tailed. The existing licensee will likely prevail in every case because the adverse economic consequences it
would bear, if denied the license, would exceed the benefits to the public competitor. However, it should be
noted that the comparative consumer cost analysis the two bills would require is superfluous under the House
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ongoing Merwin Dam dispute from the effects of the new legislation because of
"the advanced state of the Merwin proceeding and in fairness to the legitimate
expectations of the competing applicants." 8
B. Why Congress May Eliminate the Municipal Preference From FERC Rel-
icensing Proceedings
The recent action on Capitol Hill to eliminate the FPA's preference clause
from FERC relicensing decisions suggests that conditions have changed since
Congress enacted the preference clause in 1920. In the past fifty years, the
operations of privately-owned utilities have been thoroughly regulated by state
and federal governments to provide the public with service virtually indistin-
guishable from the service provided by publicly-owned utilities.84 Today, states
set the rates private utilities may charge their retail customers for service they
are obligated to provide even to the most sparsely populated areas of their ser-
vice territories.85 Moreover, since 1935, the FPC and the FERC have regulated
wholesale and interstate sales of electricity under Title II of the Federal Power
Act.8 Thus, the municipal preference controversy no longer seems to pit the
publicly-owned protectors of the public weal against evil-designing private
monopolizers.87
The public interest, which impelled enactment of the preference clause 66
years ago,88 soon may spur the clause's elimination from FERC relicensing
decisions. As the Commission discovered in Merwin Dam, the transfer of
bill, which would forbid the FERC from licensing a competing applicant where doing so would result in a
rate increase to the original licensee's customers, regardless of the comparative economic values. See supra
note 81.
83. See S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 10-11; H.R. REP. No. 507, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10,
16-17.
In addition to its relicensing provisions, H.R. 44, as passed by the House, would amend other provisions
of the FPA concerning comprehensive planning and conditions imposed by other agencies on FERC licensees.
Some of these provisions differ markedly from the Senate bill. For example, the House bill would allow the
National Marine Fisheries Service to impose mandatory conditions on FERC-licensed projects. See H.R:
REP. No. 507, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2. The Senate bill would not. Most significantly, the House bill makes
energy conservation a coequal consideration with energy development in FERC licensing decisions, requiring
the FERC to deny licenses where proposed projects would exacerbate regional power surplusses. See 132
CONG. Rxc. at H 2004 [comments of Congressman Wyden]. In addition, the House bill establishes environ-
mental requirements for projects hoping to take advantage of federal subsidies under the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). On that statute, see Cole, supra
note 78, at 647-48. Finally, H.R. 44 would place a moratorium on hydro-licensing until the FERC prepares
a complete environmental study of its overall program. See 132 CONG. REC. H2004. These provisions have
no counterparts in the Senate bill, and constitute the major stumbing blocks in the Joint Conference Commit-
tee's efforts to consolidate S. 426 and H.R. 44.
84. See 25 F.E.R.C. at 61,221 n.31; Merwin Dam Ruling Costly, THE OREGONIAN at E2 (1985);
Blamer, From Symbiosis to Synergy: A Cast Study of Public and Private Electric Power in the Pacific
Northwest, 13 ENVTL. L. 637, 638 (1983). See also supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 757.020 (1983).
86. See R. PIERCE, JR., G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, ECONOMIC REGULATION: ENERGY TRANSPOR-
TATION AND UTILITIES 739-40 (1983).
87. However, public and private power companies remain distinguishable in certain respects. For in-
stance, private companies are owned by shareholders, while public utilities are ratepayer and electorate
driven. The substantive importance of that distinction is debatable in such a highly regulated industry.
88. See supra note 10-15 and accompanying text.
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projects from private to public operation can result in substantial overall net
costs to regional customers, a result contrary to the public's continuing interest
in inexpensive power.8 Recent studies indicate that a public preference on rel-
icensing could result in net nationwide costs of between 200 million and 4.5
billion dollars each year." Such monumental costs, incurred ultimately by elec-
tric consumers over short periods of time, would destabilize the electric power
industry and possibly local economies in various regions of the country." By
contrast, a preference favoring the "equally well adapted" original licensee
would have no such destabilizing impact: the unsuccessful competitor would
simply continue to purchase or generate power at its traditional sources.92
In addition, Congress apparently senses some unfairness in the current
preferential treatment of public applicants in FERC relicensing proceedings.
Not only are public applicants assured of winning all ties, such ties are virtu-
ally ensured if the FERC is prohibited from employing a more detailed eco-
nomic analysis of competing projects.98 Moreover, under the current statutory
scheme, the unsuccessful private applicant is not guaranteed complete fifth
amendment compensation for the value of its lost property right in the pro-
ject.94 This perceived unfairness, together with the public's continuing interest
in stable and low electricity rates, constitutes the rationale behind congressional
efforts to eliminate the FPA's preference clause.
In their fight to retain relicensing advantage, public power interests sug-
gest that the municipal preference actually enhances the competitive process;
they argue that elimination of the preference would guarantee perpetual licens-
ing of private operators, who already control the vast majority of the nation's
89. 25 F.E.R.C. at 61,196-201.
90. GAO Report, supra note 9, at 9-10, reprinted in S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 245-57
(1985). In the Merwin Dam dispute alone the FERC staff estimated a potential net cost of almost $20
million if the Commission granted the new license to Clark-Cowlitz. See supra note 52.
91. Rate stability is a concept traditionally employed in utilities regulation, specifically in ratemaking
proceedings. See, e.g., WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY TARRIFFS 47, No. 1-C-10 (June 1, 1977), reprinted in A. PIERCE, JR.
G. ALLISON & P. MARTIN, supra note 86, at 389-90. One commentator has similarly used the concept of
'stability' to justify the public trust doctrine. According to Joseph Sax, the purpose of the trust is to prevent
"the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as
title." Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 185, 188
(1980). By analogizing Sax' theory to electric power rates and supplies, there should be no public preference
on relicensing because it promotes destabilization of electric rates and service.
92. According to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, a preference favoring origi-
nal licensees would, in fact, save money by discouraging "spurious but expensive 'improvements' " by utilities
willing to spend large sums of money to acquire project licenses. S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1985).
93. Whether the FERC can employ an economic analysis in comparing competing applications is at
the center of the Merwin Dam dispute. See supra notes 51-53, 62-63 and accompanying text. To end the
uncertainty, pending legislation would codify a comparative economic analysis as part of the FERC's "public
interest" test. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
94. Under the existing statutory provision, original licensees not granted new licenses may recover only
their net investment plus severance damages. 16 U.S.C. § 87(a) (1982). Under pending legislation, existing
licensees who fail to get relicensed would be compensated "under a Constitutional 'just compensation' stan-
dard." S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1985). Under a just compensation standard, the licensee
could possibly recover the current value of the project, in excess of its "net investment."
[Vol. 7:373
MERWIN DAM DISPUTE
hydroelectric projects.9" Their arguments ignore the fact that a better adapted
public power applicant could still prevail in competition against an original
licensee, without the preference clause. 6 Moreover, the municipal preference
will likely survive for initial licensing decisions because (1) the tie-breaking
preference is not usually required in initial licensing decisions, where compet-
ing applications are less likely to be identical,' 7 and (2) a preference for public
power on initial licensing does not result in the same kind of economic
destabilization caused by application of the preference on relicensing, when a
dispossessed utility is forced to replace cheap power with more expensive
power." Finally, it is difficult to see how the FERC's relicensing process is
more competitive with the preference clause, which just as surely guarantees
relicensing in perpetuity to "equally well adapted" public operators by ensur-
ing that no private operator will control a hydroproject after the initial fifty-
year license term expires.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUING MERWIN DAM DISPUTE
With the likelihood that Congress will soon eliminate the Federal Power
Act's municipal preference from the FERC relicensing decisions, the D.C. Cir-
cuit's disposition of Merwin Dam appears to have no significance beyond the
parties to the proceeding." But there is more at stake in the case that the pref-
erence issue; also at issue is the authority of a federal agency to change its
statutory interpretation in the fact of contrary judicial precedent.100
For decades, the FERC and the FPC interpreted the Federal Power Act
with virtually complete judicial and congressional acquiescence. 10' The Com-
95. See MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR METZENBAUM, S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 228.
The Senate Committee, in recommending passage of S. 426, recognized that open competition might suffer
under the bill's new preference for existing licensees, but concluded that the public interest is not always
forwarded by open competition. Id. at 6.
96. But note that a public applicant, to be "better adapted" must show that the existing licensee's
ratepayers will not suffer, if it is awarded the license. See supra note 80.
97. Contrast relicensing proceedings, where there are "practical limitation [sic] on project improve-
ments and thus the potential scope of relicensing competition." S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6.
98. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
99. Because pending legislation would grandfather the case, there is no chance of the dispute being
mooted. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 42-43, 61 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952) ("It is the Commission's judgment on
which Congress has placed its reliance for control of licenses."); National Hells Canyon Ass'n v. FPC, 237
F.2d 777, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ("we [the court] cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Commission
concerning the technical questions which were before it.") Monongehela Power Co. v. Alexander, 507 F.
Supp. 385, 391-92 (D.D.C. 1980) ("The Court's duty here is to repeal the FPC's exclusive authority only if
it is positively repugnant to or irreconcilable with the FWPCAA [Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972]. Given the FPC's substantial environmental responsibilities, it cannot fairly be said
that the difference in emphasis and perspective of the FWPCAA rises to a level sufficient to support an
implied repeal. Accordingly, an exemption for FPC-licensed projects from the licensing requirements of the
FWPCAA must be inferred."). However, recent court decisions indicate that the FERC should no longer
rely on their almost automatic acquiescence. See Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes vs. FERC: Reforming Federal
Hydroelectric Licensing, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (1986).
Note that the acquiescence traditionally shown the Commission by Congress and the courts may have
been due in large part to the lack of challenges to Commission authority before the 1970s, resulting from (1)
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mission felt free to alter its interpretations at will and without apparent ration-
alization.'0 2 In Merwin Dam, the FERC attempted to overrule a prior Com-
mission and the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals by reinterpreting the
FPA's preference provision.10 3 This practice is inimicable to principles of stare
decisis established to guarantee continuity in judicial and agency decisionmak-
ing, for the benefit of the parties appearing before them and the public at large.
In addition, the FERC's rejection of the Eleventh Circuit's Alabama Power
ruling in Merwin Dam violates the superiority of the reviewing court's prece-
dent. For these reasons, the D.C. Circuit, in its disposition of the case, should
retain Judge Mikva's strong indictment of the Commission's disregard for the
appellate court's decision10 4 and closely scrutinize the FERC's interpretation of
the FPA. That would set a precedent of significant potential consequence to
future cases involving the Commission.' 5
V. CONCLUSIONS
In his concurring opinion to the D.C. Circuit's vacated Merwin Dam deci-
sion, Judge Wright expressed concern that the judiciary not bind future Com-
missions to outdated policies.'0 However, agencies are limited in their abilities
the lack of knowledge of the effects of dam construction and hydroelectric generation on fishery resources, (2)
the lack of public interest groups to monitor Commission activities and (3) more stringent judicial standing
requirements before 1972. See Cole, supra note 78, 665, n.143.
102. For instance, the 1921 Federal Power Commission believed that the FPA required it to prepare
comprehensive development plans prior to issuing licenses or permits. See FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, H. R. Doc. No. 242, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1921); see also 16 U.S.C. §
803(a) (1982). Pursuant to that mandate, the Commission prepared at least two plan documents. See FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, supra, at 30-33 (summarizing the FPC's compre-
hensive plan for the Deschutes River in Oregon); see also SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 473, 67th Cong., 3d Sess. 27-28, 177-200 (1922) (including the Com-
mission's "Best Scheme of Development of the Colorado River Below Its Junction With the Green"). Later,
without notice or explanation, the Commission dropped that interpretation in favor of a less restrictive inter-
pretation, which merely required it to license projects in the "public interest." See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison
Co., 8 F.P.C. 364, 386 (1949); Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 F.E.R.C. 61,052, 61,176 (1983);
This change in interpretation, which occurred before 1940, went unchallenged until 1984. See infra note 105.
On the comprehinsive planning requirement under section 10(a) of the FPA, see, Cole, supra note 78.
103. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text. Arguably, FERC didn't "overrule" the Eleventh
Circuit if that court merely deferred to FERC's original interpretation. That, however, is a matter of dispute.
Contrast supra notes 40, 49, 60 & 65 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
105. For instance, such a precedent might have a dramatic impact in National Wildlife Federation v.
FERC (Salmon Basin), No. 84-7325 (9th Cir. filed May 14, 1984). In that case, the plaintiff charges that
the Commission's refusal to prepare comprehensive plans is unlawful, under section 10(a) of the FPA, 16
U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982). The Federation relies on an early FPC interpretation of the statute requiring the
Commission to prepare plans before issuing any permits or licenses. See Brief for Petitioners National Wild-
life Federation and Idaho Wildlife Federation at 20, National Wildlife Fed'n v. FERC, No. 84-7325 (9th
Cir. 1985); see also FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, supra note 102, at 30.
The FERC responds that it should not be bound by earlier Commission's opinion as to what the statute
requires. See Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 17, National Wildlife Fed'n v.
FERC, No. 84-7325 (9th Cir. 1985). Presumably, Judge Mikva would deny the FERC's contention unless
the Commission could rationalize the change in interpretations, i.e., show that the first interpretation was
mistaken. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. In regard to the Salmon Basin case, see Cole, supra
note 78, at 665-68.
106. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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to alter policies, not by the courts, but by their enabling legislation. Where
Congress has set forth a statutory requirement which can be interpreted in only
one way, given its language and legislative history, the administrator cannot be
permitted to change that interpretation to fulfill new policy objectives. Every
appellate court that has examined the FPA's preference clause has concluded
that the provision is susceptible of only one interpretation, given the statute's
language and history.1 17 Therefore, the FERC cannot be permitted to change
that interpretation to fulfill new policy goals, however laudable, without con-
gressional approval. Otherwise, the agency would usurp the role of
legislator.'0 8
While the FERC's methods may be improper, its reasoning is sound. The
municipal preference should be eliminated from FERC relicensing proceedings
because it no longer promotes the goals Congress enacted it to achieve. Specifi-
cally, application of the public preference on relicensing no longer promotes
less expensive and more widely available power; to the contrary, the costs of
implementing the provision are monumental and, inevitably, destabilizing.0 9
Private power interests, pointing to the inequities and adverse economic
consequences of the current preference scheme, recently persuaded both houses
of Congress to pass legislation eliminating the municipal preference from
FERC relicensing proceedings." 0 The House and Senate bills are currently
before a joint conference committee for consolidation."' Meanwhile, the Mer-
win Dam case lives on in the D.C. Circuit, and may ultimately make its way to
the Supreme Court. The final outcome in Congress and in the courts is certain
to have economic significance for every electric ratepayer in the country.
D. H. COLE*
107. See supra notes 39 & 57-60 and accompanying text.
108. Note that the FERC need not obtain congressional approval to change a statutory interpretation
that has not yet been settled in a judicial decision.
109. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
111. For the most part, the required consolidation concerns provisions in the bills not directly related
to the preference controversy. See supra notes 80 & 83 accompanying text.
* J.D. 1986, Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College; A.B. 1980 Occidental College;
A.M. 1981, University of Chicago.
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